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Abstract. Cognitive linguistics brought about changes starting from reshaping our 
approach to metaphors. Our bodily experience in space serves as the basis for the majority of 
metaphorical expressions and the present article focuses on some of the English, Romanian 
and Hungarian prepositions/verbal prefixes, such as over, peste, túl, végig. Their basic 
meaning(s) can be more easily understood resorting to basic spatial relationships, such as up, 
down, beyond a certain point. The conclusion presents various levels of metaphorisation and 
further possibilities regarding spatial exploration of metaphors. 
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1. Introduction 
Many people would agree that one of the most complicated things is to study 
human experience. However, the development of cognitive linguistics offered new 
and interesting approaches, among which human experience deriving from the 
surrounding space must be mentioned. 
The human experience – according to scientists – comes from the observation 
of the environment, an environment which is rather subjective, as “we are first and 
foremost spatial and visual creatures” and “there is no such thing as a neutral, 
disembodied, omniscient, or uninvolved observer. An observer’s experience is 
enabled, shaped, and ineluctably constrained by its biological endowment” 
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(Langacker 1999a: 203). Before arguing that physical experience is but one of the 
many possibilities of experience, let us focus on Lakoff and Johnson’s view: 
 
We are not claiming that physical experience is in any way more basic than 
other kinds of experience, whether emotional, mental, cultural or whatever. All 
of these experiences may be just as basic as physical experiences. Rather, what 
we are claiming about grounding is that we typically conceptualize the non-
physical in terms of the physical…that is, we conceptualize the less clearly 
delineated in terms of more clearly delineated. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 59) 
 
We may conclude that the notion of (physical) perception is vital for human 
beings, and Frith also supports this idea, stating that “everything in the world is 
placed in just two categories: nice or nasty. But we do not experience the physical 
world in terms of such crude categories”; furthermore, one of his basic arguments 
is that “Our Brain Creates an Effortless Perception of the Physical World”, so 
perception “is not a problem” (Frith 2007: 111). However, there is a problem, as 
Frith correctly observes, that the perception of the brain is in fact “an illusion 
created by our brains”. Our brain gathers information from our senses, leading to 
the concept of the ideal Bayesian observer, thus “weak evidence is ignored; strong 
evidence is emphasized” (Frith 2007: 124). Frith goes on explaining the role of the 
Sun casting light and creating shadows (shaping objects) leading to false 
perceptions, which are “fantasies that coincide with reality” (Frith 2007: 134). 
The next logical step is to check the relationship of experience and motion. 
Frith states that in case no sensory signals are available, then our brain 
missing information (Frith 2007: 135). Even infants spend a lot of time observing 
things and people in motion, and eventually “they come to understand how the 
world works at a physical level by grasping things, picking them up, dropping 
them, pulling and pushing them, hitting them, and throwing them, always watching 
how the object responds”.1 Thus infants understand spatial relationships and 
concepts of motion before they are able to use words to describe them, leading us 
to the recognition that “human beings naturally use space, motion, and the senses 
as domains for conceptually structuring less concrete, even entirely abstract aspects 
of our experience”.2
As perception and motion are interrelated, it is worth discussing the concept 
of an object moving through space. Langacker mentions that in this case mental 
scanning through the spatial domain is involved (Langacker 1999a: 172); Ribout 
also emphasises the importance of movement, stating that the psychological notion 
 
                                                     
1
 http://www.chrisdb.me.uk/wiki/doku.php?id=cognitive_linguistics#lesson_3space_landmarks_and 
_trajectors 
2
 Ibid. 
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met with the majority of relationships is that of movement. He goes on and 
concludes that all relationships expressed by prepositions can be reduced to 
stability and movement in space and time (Ribout 2002: 85). According to Frith, 
our brain links perception and action, and our body helps us learn about the world: 
“We do things to the world with our bodies and see what happens” (Frith 2007: 
130). Nevertheless, our physical body in the surrounding space is the primal source 
of information, a body which “necessarily has physical viewpoint” and 
 
human bodies share structure which ensures that they can see forwards but not 
backwards, can access objects in front of them better than ones in back of 
them, can move forwards better than backwards, and of course are 
experiencing a gravitic environment in which we are normally able to stand 
on our feet rather than our heads (Sweetser 2007: 216). 
2. Description of space 
At this point we should discuss the conception of space, a focal element in 
cognitive linguistics, relying on Langacker’s seminal work: 
 
the notion [BODY] (so far as shape is concerned) is a configuration in three-
dimensional space ... it would appear more promising to regard the conception 
of space (either two- or three-dimensional) as a basic field of representation 
grounded in genetically determined physical properties of the human 
organism and constituting an intrinsic part of our inborn cognitive apparatus 
(Langacker 1987: 148). 
 
Regier briefly mentions that the human conception of space appears to 
structure other parts of the conceptual system through spatial metaphors, as the 
human experience of space is constrained by the nature of the human perceptual 
system (Regier 1996: 4). Lakoff and Johnson, similarly claim: “The structure of 
our spatial concepts emerges from our constant spatial experience, that is, our 
interaction with the physical environment”, although Cormac states that even the 
experiences of spatial orientation involve cultural presuppositions, which means 
that one cannot have a purely physical as opposed to cultural experience (Cormac 
1985: 66). However, Edelman (2007: 429) supports the idea that space should 
serve as a natural scaffolding for supporting structured representations, whose roots 
go back to the ancient mnemonic method of loci.3
                                                     
3
 See, for instance, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Method_of_loci. 
 Thus we can reach a basic 
conclusion, namely that the source domain serves as the background for structuring 
and understanding the target domain, an idea supported by Langacker (1999a: 
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208). So SPACE, TIME, MATERIAL/SUBSTANCE and ENERGY are connected 
within the Greek philosophical system with air, water, earth and fire,4
Vision – although not exclusively – constitutes a central means of apprehending 
space (Langacker 1999a: 204-207) and a spatial vantage point is offered by the 
speaker’s location, “more abstractly, the time of speaking is a temporal vantage 
point”. We should mention that there are languages with absolute spatial system 
(Sweetser 2007: 219)
 as Langacker 
mentions, and he goes on by highlighting another aspect of conception: people are 
more concerned with what they are conceiving than in the particular way they are 
doing that (Langacker 1999b: 46). 
Thus we can turn our attention to the conceived space, together with its 
components, forming a whole system with landmark (LM), trajectory (TR), source, 
path and goal, originally deriving from Langacker, then taken over by Lakoff & 
Johnson (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) and many others. Our effort to follow the 
Lakoffian findings in describing a part of language in terms of spatial concepts is 
merely one of the possibilities to have a view upon language. A spatial account of 
abstract conceptual categories helps us in understanding, and the combination of 
objective space and human (subjective mind) in fact (re)creates the world. But in 
this case, we have to take into account SPACE, which (more or less similarly to 
number and time) is first perceived before it is conceptualised (we operate with 
terms like long, short, high, low, deep, close, distant, left, and right). Relatively, it 
was not long ago (the foundation of geometry) that this rather long and fuzzy set of 
characteristics was simplified and rationalised by terms like height, width, 
profundity, distance and position (Ribout 2002: 145). 
5
Space is not absolute, and Regier observes that whatever the range of cross-
linguistic variation in spatial semantic structure, that variation does not in any way 
correspond to a conceptual difference across languages. There is a universally shared 
 and these speakers do not use their bodies as origos for 
everyday spatial representation as pervasively as users of relative spatial language 
systems. For instance, in an absolute spatial system the utterance ‘The house is south 
of the bush.’ would sound “natural”, so the speaker’s vantage point does not 
influence the statement, leading to less egocentric spatialisation of time, as well, at 
the metaphoric level. Among others, Talmy describes this as “located object” (also 
known as target or 
relatum), arguing that properties of the objects in the spatial world are associated 
with these two roles, with reference objects typically more stable and larger than 
located objects, which is consistent with the idea that the location of the reference 
object is presumed, known or easily found (Carlson and Hill 2007). 
                                                     
4
 Cf. passage of time understood metaphorically in terms of flowing water. 
5
 For instance, the Australian Guugu Yimithirr language is absolute, always using absolute reference 
points, namely north, east, south and west, so experience constrains language (Regier 1996). 
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human conception of space derived from pre-linguistic experience, and although 
different languages may pick up on different aspects of that shared conception, no 
language can ever encode something that is conceptually alien to speakers of other 
languages. Gopnik, cited by Regier, adds that there cannot be semantic universals 
because children’s concepts change profoundly, in radical ways, and simple spatial 
terms actually mean something quite different to children than to adults. Evans and 
Green – similarly to Regier – also mention Guugu Yimithirr:  
 
Guugu Yimithirr exclusively employs a field-based frame of reference for 
locating entities in space. An important consequence of this is that speakers of 
Guugu Yimithirr must be able to dead-reckon their location with respect to the 
cardinal points of their system, wherever they are in space. (Evans and Green 
2006: 100)  
 
Another evergreen topic connected to the aforementioned ones is the 
dichotomy of body and mind, a problem discussed by Chomsky (1988), stating that 
“the mind-body problem can be posed sensibly only insofar as we have a definite 
conception of body”, but the Cartesian conception of body in terms of their contact 
mechanics would not suffice and neither would the British Neoplatonists or the 
twentieth-century Gestalt psychology. Chomsky concludes that “there is no clear 
and definite concept of body”. The problem is rediscussed by Ryle: 
 
A person therefore lives through two collateral histories, one consisting of 
what happens in and to his body, the other consisting of what happens in and 
to his mind. The first is public, the second private. The events in the first 
history are events in the physical world; those in the second are events in the 
mental world... Minds are things, but different sorts of things from bodies; 
mental processes are causes and effects, but different sorts of causes and 
effects from bodily movements. (Ryle 1949) 
 
Under normal circumstances body comes first, but occasionally it may happen 
that MIND precedes BODY. To illustrate this, we would like to mention the 
fragment from Avatar, when the protagonist is given a new body. The film presents 
this feeling successfully,6
                                                     
6
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1QEFrI-D_3c&feature=related 
 and we have to accept that hardly can language describe 
the feeling when after the wheelchairs toes delve in the earth for the first time. 
Nevertheless, concepts about language are ardently debated within cognitive 
linguistics; at this point we would only like to mention Miller’s approach: “a 
language is learnable ... speakers can understand novel utterances, without explicit 
training in their use” (Miller 1999: 148). 
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After human perception, body, motion and space, the next keyword may be 
time, which is often mentioned connected to space. 
3. SPACE and TIME 
According to cognitive linguists, SPACE and TIME can be regarded as the 
two most fundamental domains of human experience; in this respect see, for 
instance, Evans & Green (2006: 68). They propose a basic difference between 
TIME and SPACE: “while TIME has the property of progression, SPACE is static 
(Evans & Green 2006: 515). Thus the concept of TIME is described in terms of 
motion, from which results that expressions including time are all metaphoric in 
nature. Dominte (1970) mentions main and secondary prepositions in space and 
time, stating that in space we have position (state) and movement, whereas in time 
we have moment and period (length), adding that constructions with time follow 
the model of spatial ones, never vice versa,7
                                                     
7
 (Dominte 
1970: 270) 
 quoting Pottier (1962); thus time can 
be described in terms of space, that is the “spatialisation of time”, to which Gibbs 
(1994: 75) adds that certain concepts are impossible to describe non-metaphorically 
(e.g. TIME with recourse to SPACE and MOTION). 
The relationship between SPACE and culture is another interesting topic in 
cognitive linguistics. For instance, Cormac formulates the question: if some spatial 
concepts vary from culture to culture, then how can we have any certainty that 
spatial concepts emerge directly? Metaphoric expressions depend on the context of 
the hearer for their interpretation, and the context can vary from culture to culture 
(Cormac 1985: 70); however, Lakoff later proves that variations from culture to 
culture are less important than similarities. 
At this point we seem to reiterate the idea that physical experience is central, 
though we cannot say that it is more basic than other (cf. emotions or time), 
although at a given point Langacker considers time more important than space, as 
the former is needed to perceive changes in the latter (motion); the next section 
presents this reordering. 
4. TIME and SPACE 
Ribout highlights the diachronic aspect of time: it was often personified and 
even worshipped in many religions (Ribout 2002: 165–166), an honour never 
shared by space. Langacker replenishes the fire: 
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The fact that we often conceive and speak of time in spatial terms only shows 
the utility of such metaphor for higher-level conceptualization. It does not imply 
that the experience of time is reducible to a purely spatial one; if anything, the 
opposite would seem more plausible. (Langacker 1987: 148–149) 
 
Langacker even accepts Givón’s (Givón 1979) perspective, according to 
which “time is in some sense more fundamental than space: the conception of 
spatial relationships involves scanning, which requires processing time, and our 
notions of spatial extension are intimately bound up with time-extended physical 
actions”. However, “some kind of inborn field of spatial representation” is also left, 
as human sensory capacities are “responsible” for a variety of basic domains 
(visual system, taste, smell, touch), concluding that: 
 
we cannot reasonably hope, for example, to explicate a taste sensation in 
terms of space, time in terms of color, smells in terms of pitch, kinaesthetic 
sensations in terms of temperature, or pressure in terms of emotion. (idem.) 
5. SPACE and prepositions 
Brugman’s seminal work on prepositions (Brugman 1988) started a revolution 
within cognitive linguistics, which came to complete (and not necessarily compete) 
generative linguistics (Imre 2010a). The study of over offered the possibility to 
analyse all the “marginal” morphological categories starting from perception, world-
knowledge, image schema and prototype theory. As we analysed the rather intricate 
system of prepositions, we can conclude that space serves as the scaffolding in their 
understanding, and more and more cases within a category come up, our 
brain/knowledge tries to “fit it into” the previous schema. Frith supports this idea: 
 
A system that constructs models of the outside world in this way will use any 
information it can get to help it make better models. No preference is given to 
vision or sound or touch as long as they are informative. And the system will 
make predictions about how the signals coming from all the senses will 
change when I act on the world. (Frith 2007: 127) 
 
We suppose – for instance – that the linguistic modelling of prepositions in 
various languages (over in English, peste in Romanian or át in Hungarian) is 
similar: the moment we mention any of these items, either starting with a verb 
(verbal preposition, verbal prefix) or without (preposition), our brain tries to create 
an acceptable space for that: jump over (En), sare peste (Ro), átugrik (Hu), 
probably starting from the ICM/image schema, as our brain contains many maps 
and models to make predictions and simulate actions (Frith). For instance, if the 
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trajectory (TR) touches the landmark (LM) while in motion, we can say that there 
is an on relationship between the two, but if there is some space between the two, 
the relationship changes into over/above. The latter can be further differentiated: if 
distance is viewed relatively small, then we are likely to choose above, but if it is 
huge, over is highly preferred in a canonical view8
                                                     
8
 As an example, remember Israel Kamakawiwo’ole’s famous song entitled Somewhere over the rainbow. 
 (Imre 2010a). 
– interestingly – splits the main meanings of the Romanian peste into three categories 
, expressing spatial, temporal and quantitative relations. Moreover, she 
observes that in some spatial relations there is no contact between TR and LM; we 
can add that sometimes the lack of contact is minimal, so the moving object seems to 
preserve a minimal distance in order to avoid contact (Imre 2009: 726): 
 
(1)  
‘He threw a snowball over the roof.’ 
 
(2)  
‘He jumped over the hole.’ 
 
However, if contact is established, especially in combination with verbs 
indicating movement (run, pass), then peste can be translated into English with 
across instead of over, and thus we get to Vasiliu’s description (Vasiliu 1961). This 
only proves the idea developed by Eleanor Rosch, namely prototype theory, which 
relies on spatial semantics (Rosch 1975). However, TR and LM are usually 
included schematically, as an open slot (Langacker 1986: 8). The most important 
function of a preposition is to establish connection  and 
as such, it is part of a structure with three elements, being placed between two 
autonomous lexical terms. For instance, with the help of the prototypical spatial 
case, we could describe 10 different variants for the Romanian deasupra (Imre 
2010b), but in case of the Hungarian át, we detected at least 6 major senses, and 
only one of them had around 30 less prototypical possibilities deriving from the 
central sense (Imre 2010a), detailed below. 
After having discussed the major senses of over, we realised that the complete 
picture includes above, across and through as well. Naturally, these English 
prepositions have their equivalents in Romanian and Hungarian as well, so we 
analysed prin and peste (Romanian), át, keresztül, fölött/felett and felül (Hungarian).  
The central sense of prin was subdivided into eight more types: 
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PRIN through obstacle:  
Eroul trece prin foc ‘The hero goes through fire and sword.’  
(The hero goes through thick and thin.) 
PRIN through aperture: 
A sc ‘He escaped as if through the pin-point.’  
(He had a narrow escape.) 
PRIN create aperture: 
 a din dos. ‘He escaped through the back door.’ 
PRIN inside: 
‘He is walking as a prince through the orache.’ 
(He is peacocking around.) 
PRIN through inside: 
I-a tr ‘It struck through his mind that she 
was right.’ 
PRIN instrumental: 
 ‘It spreads by word of mouth.’ 
PRIN proximity: 
(de) ‘The Turks are invading from 
everywhere.’ 
PRIN time: 
 ‘They will get married (somewhere) around/in 
 May.’ 
 
The central sense of peste offered four more possibilities: 
 
PESTE over/above (the obstacle may be vertical or horizontal, either in contact or 
not with the moving object and even ‘upward’): 
 L-a aruncat peste bord. ‘He threw it over board.’ (He gave up using it.) 
 Erau cadavre peste cadavre. ‘There were corpses one over the other.’ (The 
 corpses were piled up.) 
PESTE excess: 
 Obr ‘You are impudent beyond measure.’ 
PESTE (partial) cover: 
A trecut cu buretele peste incidentul de ieri. ‘He passed the sponge over 
yesterday’s incident.’ 
PESTE time: 
 S-a f ‘He grew up overnight.’ 
 
The very complex Hungarian át initially was split into six major categories, 
but further subdivision was also needed. However, due to the constraints of this 
article, only the six major categories are presented below: 
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ÁT through (virtual) boundary/obstacle: 
 Áthatol a falon. ‘It penetrates (through) the wall.’ 
ÁT through aperture: 
 Átnéz a kulcslyukon. ‘He peeps through the key-hole.’ 
ÁT over (above/across): 
 A gólya átszállt a tó fölött. ‘The stork flew over the lake.’ 
ÁT change: 
 Átalakítja a kormányt. ‘He changes the cabinet.’ 
ÁT from-to: 
 Az árok egyik partjáról átbeszélnek a másikra. ‘They are talking over the ditch.’ 
ÁT (partial) cover: 
 ‘The ampelopsis enwreathes the fence.’ 
 
The Hungarian keresztül seems to be a partial synonym to át (through), but at 
a closer look we were able to identify eight distinct categories: 
 
KERESZTÜL through: 
 Pista sok bajon ment keresztül. ‘Steve went through many hardships.’ 
KERESZTÜL through aperture: 
 ‘He is looking through the oillet.’ 
KERESZTÜL over-above: 
 Keresztülhord az ágyú a hegyen. ‘The cannon carries across the mountain.’ 
KERESZTÜL through/across horizontal: 
 Keresztülvágja magát mindenen. ‘He cuts his way through/across everything.’ 
KERESZTÜL again: 
 Keresztüljárta a hideg. ‘The cold went through him over and over again.’ (He 
 was taken in by the cold.) 
KERESZTÜL block: 
 Tüskék keresztülfekszik útját. ‘Thorns thwart his advancement.’ 
KERESZTÜL time: 
Évszázadokon keresztül élt a tévhit. ‘People were under the delusion for 
centuries.’ 
KERESZTÜL instrumental: 
 happened.’ 
 
Much fewer cases were found regarding fölött/felett (above level/amount, 
time, cover), whereas in case of felül it is worth considering its different 
grammatical functions: adverb, postposition and preverb (verbal prefix). 
During mapping various senses we could detect metaphorical extensions 
which “communicate” with each other without the mediating central senses (e.g. in 
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case of through). We have also realised that beyond will further extend the 
meaning of over in all three languages, bringing into picture further prepositions or 
verbal prefixes. Finally, it is our firm belief that results of cognitive linguistics may 
be used in translation studies as well; it is really fascinating how prepositions are 
preserved, changed, or they completely disappear in the act of translation. 
6. Mental SPACE 
Geeraerts mentions twelve fundamental parts of cognitive linguistics: 
Cognitive Grammar, grammatical construal, radial network, prototype theory, 
schematic network, conceptual metaphor, image schema, metonymy, mental 
spaces, frame semantics, construction grammar, and usage-based linguistics 
(Geeraerts, Dirven, & Taylor 2006: 2). The list contains mental spaces, which was 
discussed by Fauconnier & Turner extensively (2003). 
In their framework four spaces are mentioned: a source input space, a target 
input space, a blend between both, and a so-called generic space (Geeraerts 2006: 
14). Thus, the mapping between the two input spaces creates a blended space, 
whereas the generic space contains the common structure of the input spaces. Thus 
theoretical/unreal situations are easily created (including metaphors as well), as we 
can imagine new situations, such possible worlds, in which Homo neanderthalensis 
can challenge Homo sapiens, without thinking too much about the possibility of 
their meeting, and focusing on the type of challenge. The present is blended with 
the past, so the conceptual process is metaphorical. Fauconnier & Turner further 
warn us that the process is in fact central, uniform, and pervasive, not an exotic 
blend or marginal manifestations of meaning. They explain: 
 
Mental spaces are small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, 
for purposes of local understanding and action. Mental spaces are ... 
interconnected, and can be modified as thought and discourse unfold. ... 
Blending is an operation that takes place over conceptual integrations 
networks. Conceptual integration networks often involve many mental spaces. 
Blending can occur at many different sites in the network. A blended space 
can have multiple input spaces. Blending is a dynamic process that can 
happen repeatedly in the same network. (Fauconnier & Turner 1998: 305) 
 
It is important to remember that even if the blend has been formed, the initial 
spaces do not disappear, as “the blend is valuable only because it is connected 
conceptually to the inputs” (Fauconnier & Turner 1998), and there is no danger of 
confusing the blend with reality. The final aim is to create an effect at “human 
scale” of direct perception with few participants and immediate bodily effect. 
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At this point we get back to our starting point (cf. human experience, body, 
surrounding environment), thus we can draw the conclusion that “blending is a 
basic cognitive operation” partially responsible for human creativity, as they 
develop through composition, completion, and elaboration. Thus we can agree with 
Fauconnier when observing that “spaces are built up from many sources. One of 
these is the set of conceptual domains we already know about”, and humans never 
stop creating newer mental spaces as they are placed dynamically in working 
memory, even being entrenched in long-term memory (Fauconnier 2007: 351). He 
mentions “space builders”, i.e. linguistic elements that create possibility: 
prepositions, adverbials, conjunctions, clauses, subject-verb complexes (think, 
believe), but names, tenses, moods, presuppositional constructions can also 
function as space builders; possible connectors between these spaces is the copula 
and other copulative verbs: be, become, remain (Fauconnier 2007: 371–372). 
7. Conclusions 
Similarly to things that are usually taken for granted, it is very problematic to 
discuss space as such. Consequently we have tried to offer a possible view on 
SPACE in cognitive linguistics (as the title suggests) by trying to unveil the sources 
of human perception, the concept of body, the relationship of space and time, 
offering a glimpse from the extensive studies on prepositions as well, concluding 
with blended mental SPACES. We can only hope that it was worth the effort. 
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